Kant's Critique of Judgment

This is different from actualiseking egress particular kinds of palpate dwell and trying to understand them. Instead, Kant's order is to embrace experience and by using reason see what the experience reveals. Thus does the rational mind refine and break down toward insight via logical processes; such processes are the frame of reason, and through and through them significance and principles can be gradually discerned.

The analogous locomote which imparts integrity to the various representations in oneness judgment imparts unity likewise to the mere synthesis of various representations in one light, and this unity may be called the pure concept of the understanding. The same understanding, by the same operations by which in concepts it achieves, through analytical unity, the logical form of a judgment, introduces also, through the man-made unity of the manifold in intuition in general, a transcendental content into its representations. These representations are therefore called pure concepts of the understanding, and they announce a priori to objects, a reference which can non be established by general logic (Kant, Pure 111).

The operative words in this passage refer to judgment, intuition, synthesis, and so on--words that have to do with method, process, movement, reaction. but what one learns or discovers may be significant, but it is not decisive; the progressive unfolding of discovery or collection of experience is. As Friedrich puts it, "Neither ideas nor ideals are the ultimate mankind [

Connected to the process or experience of reflection, which may plainly be evanescent, is another pass judgment: purposiveness or metaphysical finality in nature. This notion, according to Korner, does not depend on the desires or preferences of the rational being, and Kant "clearly distinguishes amongst a purposive whole and the purpose which it serves." Korner continues,

Kant connects the encounter with fairness or purity with a rational acceptance of the existence of God as the highest good (Beck 300-2; Korner 128; Kant, Practical 311). For Kant, the encounter with goodness is an act of the leave, but it is also an enactment of (practical) reason.

It is at this headspring that the Kantian concept of the savourless imperative enters the discussion. According to Korner, the categorical imperative is the obligation to behave incorruptly, predicated of a wish for " be to the possibility of the highest good" (Kant, Practical 311). Happiness is achieved when the chaste will intersects with the highest good, and when that happens, moral enactment becomes the enactment of a universal moral law. Kant refers to this as duty, although for him duty does not mean a come of rules. Rather duty is projected from the reasoning toward meaning, and from the enactment of such meaning in reason. This is the background for the gap between intuition and action, between observation and a strong moral sense:

Otto also discusses an apprehension of religious experience, not as oriented toward a result (whether salvation or an earthly cheers for following religious precepts), but toward the more general moral or religious experience. This implies a connective between the experience of the Sublime and the moral experience that is predicated of the projection of reason, via human will, onto the world. The connection may be indirect, for Kant does make significant distinctions between the surroundings of reason and the environment of aesthetic judgment. However, the moments of intersection
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